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Abstract
We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation
is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed,
then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify
equivalence classes of beliefs giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61.
Key words: Beliefs, Pareto Optimality.
Suggested running title: Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets
2
1 Introduction
In this note, we seek to answer a very simple question: what can we learn about agents’ beliefs
by the sole knowledge that a given allocation is Pareto optimal? More specifically, consider a
multiple-goods, two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period and agents that are
subjective expected utility maximizers. Take a Pareto optimal allocation of this economy. Is it
possible that this allocation still be Pareto optimal in an economy in which agents’ beliefs have
changed?
We answer this question affirmatively and actually identify the exact change of beliefs needed.
The result we obtain is actually stronger: if agent h’s subjective probability of state s divided
by that of state s′ in the second economy (i.e., the economy after beliefs have changed) is
proportional (with the same coefficient of proportionality for all the agents) to the same ratio
in the initial economy, then, the set of Pareto optimal allocations is the same in those two
economies. We furthermore show that this is equivalent to the two sets of Pareto optimal
allocations having one (interior) point in common. Hence, two contract curves associated to two
economies with different beliefs are either equal or disjoint.
To the best of our knowledge, this point, as simple as it seems, has not been studied in
the literature. In a sense, the class of probabilities we identify is similar to what Radner (1979)
called “confounding” probabilities in a (rational expectations) equilibrium set-up, since in our
set-up, two such sets of beliefs lead to the same Pareto optimal set.
2 The set up and main result
We consider a standard two period economy with uncertainty in the second period. There are
H agents, h = 1, ...,H and C commodities, c = 1, ..., C, in each spot market. Without loss of
generality we assume that there is no consumption in the first period. Uncertainty is represented
by a state space S = {1, ..., S}, with s ∈ S a state of nature. Total contingent endowments are
given by e = (e (1) , ..., e (S)) ∈ RCS++.
Agents are subjective expected utility maximizers with beliefs pih = (pih (1) , ..., pih (S)). It is
assumed that pih (s) > 0 ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S} and, naturally that
∑
s pih (s) = 1 for all h. Agent h
has consumption set RCS++, certainty preferences represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index uh : RC++ → R. uh is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, differ-
entiably strictly increasing (i.e., ∇uh (x)  0 for x  0) and differentiably strictly concave
(i.e., ∆xt∇2uh (x)∆x < 0 for x  0, ∆x 6= 0), and to have indifference surfaces with closures
in RC++. Finally, the household evaluates its contingent consumption plan, represented by the
vector xh = (xh (1) , ..., xh (S)) ∈ RCS++, according to the von Neumann-Morgenstern functional
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Vh (xh (1) , ..., xh (S)) =
∑
s pih (s)uh (xh (s)).
An allocation x = (x1, ..., xH) is feasible if xh (s) 0 for all h and all s and
∑H
h=1 xh (s) =
e (s) for all s. An allocation x is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation x′ such
that Vh(x′h) ≥ Vh(xh) for all h and Vh(x′h) > Vh(xh) for some h.
In this note, we take the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices and total endowments to
be fixed and allow changes in agents’ beliefs. Let P (pi) be the set of Pareto optima of the economy
where agents have beliefs pi = (pi1, ..., piH). Recall that in our simple set-up1 an allocation x is a
Pareto optimal allocation if and only if there exists a vector of weights λ = (λ1, ..., λH) 0 such
that x is a solution to the problem max
∑H
h=1 λh
∑S
s=1 pih (s)uh (xh (s)) s.t.
∑H
h=1 xh (s) = e (s)
for all s and xh  0 for all h.
The main result of this note is to compare the set of Pareto optimal allocations in two
economies differing only by the agents’ beliefs.
Proposition 1 The following three assertions are equivalent:
(i) P (pi) = P (pˆi)
(ii) P (pi) ∩ P (pˆi) 6= ∅
(iii) ∀h, h′,∀s, s′, pih(s)/pih(s′)pih′ (s)/pih′ (s′) =
pˆih(s)/pˆih(s
′)
pˆih′ (s)/pˆih′ (s′)
Proof.
Recall first the following lemma (see, e.g., Cass, Chichilnisky, and Wu (1996)):
Lemma: A feasible allocation x is Pareto optimal if and only if there exist positive weights,
λh > 0, all h, and strictly positive contingent goods prices (multipliers) for each state, µ(s) 0,
all s, such that
λhpih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = µ(s), all h, s
Let us now prove our result.
That (i) implies (ii) is trivial.
(ii) =⇒ (iii)
Assume that P (pi) ∩ P (pˆi) 6= ∅ and pick a feasible allocation x in P (pi) ∩ P (pˆi) . Then,
there exist λ = (λ1, ..., λH)  0 and λˆ =
(
λˆ1, ..., λˆH
)
 0 as well as µ = (µ(1), ..., µ(S)) and
µ̂ = (µ̂(1), ..., µ̂(S)) such that, for all h, h′ and all s:
λhpih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = λh′pih′ (s)∇uh′ (xh′ (s)) = µ(s)
λˆhpˆih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = λˆh′ pˆih′ (s)∇uh′ (xh′ (s)) = µ̂(s)
1See for instance Cass, Chichilnisky, and Wu (1996).
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Hence,
λhpih (s)
λh′pih′ (s)
=
λˆhpˆih (s)
λˆh′ pˆih′ (s)
, ∀h, h′, s
Therefore, for all s, s′, h and h′:
pih (s)
pih′ (s)
pˆih′ (s)
pˆih (s)
=
pih (s′)
pih′ (s′)
pˆih′ (s′)
pˆih (s′)
proving (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (i)
Let x ∈ P (pi). Then, by the lemma, there exists a vector of weights λ = (λ1, ..., λH)  0
and multipliers (contingent goods prices) µ = (µ(1), ..., µ(S)) ∈ RCS++ such that, for all h and all
s:
λhpih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = µ(s) (1)
Now, by assumption,
pih (s) /pih (1)
pi1 (s) /pi1 (1)
=
pˆih (s) /pˆih (1)
pˆi1 (s) /pˆi1 (1)
for all h and all s. Hence, (1) is equivalent to:
λh
pih (1)
pih (1)
pˆih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = pi1 (1)
pi1 (s)
pi1 (s)
pi1 (1)
µ(s)
for all h and all s. Therefore, defining λ̂h = λh
pih(1)
bpih(1)
and µ̂(s) = pi1(1)pi1(s)
bpi1(s)
bpi1(1)
µ(s), we get that
λˆhpˆih (s)∇uh (xh (s)) = µ̂(s)
for all h and all s. Since λ̂h > 0 and µ̂(s) > 0, this establishes (by the lemma above) that x
∈ P (pˆi). Therefore, P (pi) ⊆ P (pˆi). The converse inclusion also holds by a symmetric argument.
Hence P (pi) = P (pˆi).
Observe that condition (iii) in the proposition does not imply that pih = pˆih for all h, as
shown by the following example: H = 2, S = 2, and pi1 (1) = 14 , pi2 (1) =
1
3 , pˆi1 (1) =
13
16 and
pˆi2 (1) = 1315 .
To interpret condition (iii), observe that the ratio pih(s)pih(s′) is simply the marginal rate of
substitution, say of good 1, between state s and s′ when agent h is risk neutral (i.e., has a
linear utility index). Alternatively, it is the marginal rate of substitution between state s and s′
at points where the consumer is fully insured, i.e., consumes the same bundle in each of these
states.
Remark 1 If we were to take RCS+ rather than RCS++ as households’ consumption set and extend
the domain of the utility function accordingly, the same result would continue to hold, in which
condition (ii) is replaced by P (pi) ∩ P (pˆi) ∩ RCSH++ 6= ∅.
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Remark 2 The framework developed can be reinterpreted in an intertemporal setting, with
time-separable, time-independent preferences. Indeed, interpreting s as a time index and writing
pih (s) = (βh)
s where βh is h’s stationary discount factor, our result says that if the discount
factor changes but the ratios of the discount factors for any two agents remain the same, then
the two economies have the same Pareto optima.
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